Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Parmenides, Leucippus and Paul Benacerraf

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers


59 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Parmenides was much more cautious about accepting ideas than his predecessors [Simplicius on Parmenides]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematical truth is always compromising between ordinary language and sensible epistemology [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
There are no such things as numbers [Benacerraf]
Obtaining numbers by abstraction is impossible - there are too many; only a rule could give them, in order [Benacerraf]
We must explain how we know so many numbers, and recognise ones we haven't met before [Benacerraf]
Numbers can't be sets if there is no agreement on which sets they are [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
If numbers are basically the cardinals (Frege-Russell view) you could know some numbers in isolation [Benacerraf]
Benacerraf says numbers are defined by their natural ordering [Benacerraf, by Fine,K]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
To understand finite cardinals, it is necessary and sufficient to understand progressions [Benacerraf, by Wright,C]
A set has k members if it one-one corresponds with the numbers less than or equal to k [Benacerraf]
To explain numbers you must also explain cardinality, the counting of things [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
We can count intransitively (reciting numbers) without understanding transitive counting of items [Benacerraf]
Someone can recite numbers but not know how to count things; but not vice versa [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
The application of a system of numbers is counting and measurement [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
The successor of x is either x and all its members, or just the unit set of x [Benacerraf]
For Zermelo 3 belongs to 17, but for Von Neumann it does not [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / b. Mathematics is not set theory
Disputes about mathematical objects seem irrelevant, and mathematicians cannot resolve them [Benacerraf, by Friend]
No particular pair of sets can tell us what 'two' is, just by one-to-one correlation [Benacerraf, by Lowe]
If ordinal numbers are 'reducible to' some set-theory, then which is which? [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
An adequate account of a number must relate it to its series [Benacerraf]
The job is done by the whole system of numbers, so numbers are not objects [Benacerraf]
If any recursive sequence will explain ordinals, then it seems to be the structure which matters [Benacerraf]
The number 3 defines the role of being third in a progression [Benacerraf]
Number words no more have referents than do the parts of a ruler [Benacerraf]
Mathematical objects only have properties relating them to other 'elements' of the same structure [Benacerraf]
How can numbers be objects if order is their only property? [Benacerraf, by Putnam]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Number-as-objects works wholesale, but fails utterly object by object [Benacerraf]
Realists have semantics without epistemology, anti-realists epistemology but bad semantics [Benacerraf, by Colyvan]
The platonist view of mathematics doesn't fit our epistemology very well [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 5. Numbers as Adjectival
Number words are not predicates, as they function very differently from adjectives [Benacerraf]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
The set-theory paradoxes mean that 17 can't be the class of all classes with 17 members [Benacerraf]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is not divisible, since it is all alike [Parmenides]
No necessity could produce Being either later or earlier, so it must exist absolutely or not at all [Parmenides]
Being must be eternal and uncreated, and hence it is timeless [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
The realm of necessary non-existence cannot be explored, because it is unknowable [Parmenides]
There is no such thing as nothing [Parmenides]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / f. Primary being
Parmenides at least saw Being as the same as Nous, and separate from the sensed realm [Parmenides, by Plotinus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
All our concepts of change and permanence are just names, not the truth [Parmenides]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Something must be unchanging to make recognition and knowledge possible [Aristotle on Parmenides]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Identity statements make sense only if there are possible individuating conditions [Benacerraf]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
The first way of enquiry involves necessary existence [Parmenides]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 8. Transcendental Necessity
Everything happens by reason and necessity [Leucippus]
Necessity sets limits on being, in order to give it identity [Parmenides]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Thinking implies existence, because thinking depends on it [Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Parmenides treats perception and intellectual activity as the same [Theophrastus on Parmenides]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Only reason can prove the truth of facts [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / e. The One
People who say that the cosmos is one forget that they must explain movement [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one is without any kind of motion [Parmenides]
There could be movement within one thing, as there is within water [Aristotle on Parmenides]
The one can't be divisible, because if it was it could be infinitely divided down to nothing [Parmenides, by Simplicius]
Defenders of the One say motion needs the void - but that is not part of Being [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
Reason sees reality as one, the senses see it as many [Aristotle on Parmenides]
Reality is symmetrical and balanced, like a sphere, with no reason to be greater one way rather than another [Parmenides]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / f. Ancient elements
He taught that there are two elements, fire the maker, and earth the matter [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
It is feeble-minded to look for explanations of everything being at rest [Aristotle on Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void can't exist, and without the void there can't be movement or separation [Parmenides, by Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
What could have triggered the beginning [of time and being]? [Parmenides]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
He was the first to discover the identity of the Morning and Evening Stars [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]
He was the first person to say the earth is spherical [Parmenides, by Diog. Laertius]